# 1NC

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**The role of the ballot is to determine the efficacy of a topical proposal relative to the status quo or a competing option.**

**Anticompetitive’ behavior are business practices that restrict competition without providing lower cost or higher quality goods and services**

**OECD 3 –** OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms, from the Glossary of Industrial Organisation Economics and Competition Law, compiled by R. S. Khemani and D. M. Shapiro, commissioned by the Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs, OECD, 1993, https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=3145

**Definition**:

Anticompetitive practices refer to a wide range of business practices in which a **firm** or **group of firms** may engage in order to **restrict inter-firm competition** to **maintain** or **increase** their **relative market position** and **profits** **without** necessarily providing goods and services at a **lower cost** or of **higher quality**.

**‘Expanding the scope’ must increase the area covered by antitrust law**

Cesar A. **Noble 17**, Judge on the Connecticut Superior Court, Hartford Judicial District, 777 Residential, LLC v. Metro. Dist. Comm'n, 2017 Conn. Super. LEXIS 4178, \*4-5 (Conn. Super. Ct. August 1, 2017), 8/1/2017, Lexis

The defendant relies upon §7-249 as authority for the supplemental assessment. The statute provides that "[b]enefits to buildings or structures constructed or expanded after the initial assessment may be assessed as if the new or expanded buildings or structures had existed at the time of the initial assessment." The parties dispute whether the conversion of the property constitutes a construction or expansion of buildings or structures granting authority to the defendant to levy a supplemental assessment. The plaintiff argues that because the conversion did **not constitute an expansion**, that is, an **increase in the volume or physical area** of a building the defendant had no authority under §7-249 for the supplemental assessment. **5** In the view of the plaintiff it is significant that the conversion did not increase the physical footprint or interior square footage of the property in any way including by a vertical [\*5] enlargement. Absent such an increase, asserts the plaintiff, there can be no construction or expansion of any building or structure. The defendant assert that the construction of the 285 new residential units constitute new structures within the plain meaning of §7-249. The court agrees with the defendant.

[FOOTNOTE]

5 The plaintiff relies upon the definition of the word "expand" found in Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed. 2002) of "to open up; to **increase** the **extent**, **number**, **volume**, or **scope** of."

**Violation---the affirmative doesn’t defend prohibitions on anticompetitive business practices by the private sector by at least expanding the scope of its core antitrust laws.**

**The impact is clash---debates about scholarship in a vacuum are myopic and breed reactionary generics---they allow the aff to cement their infinite prep advantage, because all the aff has to do is find evidence supporting an ideological orientation towards the world---this crushes clash because all of our prepared negative strategies are based on praxis, and by not defending a clear actor and mechanism we lose 90% of negative ground, and the aff still retains traditional competition standards like perms to make being neg impossible---clash is an intrinsic good and it’s vital to the overall practice of debate. Every debater is here for different reasons, but they trace back to the pedagogical uniqueness of the space. An open topic prevents iteration through shallow debates, unpredictable advocacies, and lack of testing.**

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**The aff drifts from capital as the object of negation to authority. It’ll be appropriated and blown off track by ‘lifestyle capitalism’.**

Dr. Marla **Zubel 13**, Ph.D. in Comparative Literature from the University of Minnesota, Twin Cities, Now Professor of English at Western Kentucky University, BA in Literature and Sociology from the University of California, Santa Cruz, “The Utopian Catastrophism of Insurrectionary Politics”, The New Everyday – A Media Commons Project, 2-21, <http://mediacommons.org/tne/pieces/utopian-catastrophism-insurrectionary-politics#sdfootnote2sym> [grammar edited]

Like Sorel's general strike11, which also calls for the **ceaseless quasi-apocalyptic transformation** of society, the insurrection fights only for its continuation, and is thus **decidedly lacking** in specific political content. Or, like the metaphysical ontology of Artaud's “Theater of Cruelty”12 the insurrection allows for the spectacular release of “primordial unruliness” against various aspects of bourgeois conformism (The fact that insurrectionary theories like Sorel's have historically been **appropriated by fascism and other right-wing movements** will be dealt with momentarily). The insurrection's conception of time, like the “general strike” and “theater of cruelty,” is a static one. Insurrectionary events are removed from a dynamic revolutionary process and signal instead the time of capitalism brought to an abrupt end. Although in TCI the insurrection is uni-directional in so far as it is said to be “coming,” once it begins, time is brought to a standstill. With a nod to that famous graffiti of the May events, the last page of the book reads, it is “impossible to say whether it has been months or years since the 'events' began” (135). Refusing to deal directly with the intrinsically transitory nature of insurrectionary events, the Invisible Committee writes, “The goals of insurrection is to become irreversible. It becomes irreversible when you've defeated both authority and the need for authority, property and the taste for appropriation, hegemony and the desire for hegemony” (130-131). “Hegemony,” here is rejected as authoritarian (the point for Gramsci, of course, was not to do away with hegemony, as such, but for the subaltern classes to overthrow bourgeois hegemony and become hegemonic themselves). The insurrection must be left open, resisting closure in time and consolidation (by a class) in space. Thus, despite its claims to communism, in TCI, the “standpoint of the proletariat”13 or any other standpoint for that matter is nowhere to be found. TCI justifies its anti-class consciousness by arguing that capitalism has all but done away with the working class:

"[Labor] can no longer consolidate itself as a force, being outside the center of production process and employed to plug the holes of what has not yet been mechanized...today work is tied less to the economic necessity of producing goods than to the political necessity of producing producers and consumers and of preserving by any means necessary the order of work" (48-49).

While such a diagnosis of the post-industrial economies of the West may offer interesting insights into the role of work as a means of social control, to declare the worker entirely outside the production process and therefore irrelevant to the revolutionary transformation of that process, is not only to **deny** the on-going economic necessity of labor in its variously outsourced forms, but also to **obfuscate the material relations of capitalism** by way of **mystifying production**, or, what's worse, **uncritically reproducing the fetishization** of the labor commodity. This should not be surprising however, for in the generalized climate of catastrophe put forward by TCI, the enemy is **authority as such**, and not the **determinate negation of capitalism** by a class, or any other kind of social formation for that matter.

An almost hundred year-old debate between Lenin and Kautsky provides in interesting entry point for analyzing TCI's absolute rejection of, and fetishization of authority, over and above its critique of capitalism and, as such, helps to explain its ability to be **easily appropriated** by the radical right. In Lenin's polemic against Karl Kautsky in The State and Revolution14, he exposes the revolutionary limits of pure negation and its potentially counter-revolutionary consequences.

When Kautsky writes, “We can safely leave the solution of the problem of the proletarian dictatorship to the future,” Lenin argues that such an unwillingness to deal with the practical problems of the revolution results in the deformation not only of Marxism but of the revolution itself, “At present the opportunists ask nothing better than to quite safely leave to the future all fundamental questions of the tasks of the proletarian revolution” (Lenin, 353). Lenin goes on to accuse the anarchists of refusing to think through the contradictions of the state in favor of an oversimplified un-dialectical negation. Characterizing the anarchist position, Lenin writes:

"'We must think only of destroying the old state machine; it is no use probing into the concrete lessons of earlier proletarian revolutions and analyzing what to put in the place of what has been destroyed, and how,' argues the anarchist (the best of the anarchists, of course, and not those who, following the Kropotkins and Co., trail behind the bourgeoisie). Consequently, the tactics of the anarchist become the tactics of despair instead of a ruthlessly bold revolutionary effort to solve concrete problems while taking into account the practical conditions of the mass movement" (362).

The point here is not to uncritically validate Lenin's “bold revolutionary efforts” but it is at least to insist on the need for revolutionary responsibility. For the continual refusal to think through the material complexities of revolutionary strategy in favor of arousing the purely negating force of the insurrection, may prove not only **strategically insufficient**, but the **political neutral** “tractics of despair” might [prove] prive **equally seductive** to the far Left as to the far Right.15

The **easy slippage** from Left libertarianism to Right libertarianism is observable throughout much of the 20th century, and American ideologies of rugged individualism have long provided **fertile breeding ground** for anti-government sentiments and the idealization of “small is beautiful” style capitalism. The presidential campaigns of Republican Ron Paul (and the recent participation of Ron Paul supporters in the Occupy movement) backed enthusiastically by those self-identifying as belonging to both the Left and the Right, is but the most recent manifestation of this libertarian confusion. But this kind of political ambiguity is nothing new. Both Sorel and Blanqui were taken up enthusiastically by a young Mussolini, whose Nietzsche-inspired 'socialism' made for an easy transition to fascist politics. In Critique of Everyday Life Vol. 216, Henri Lefebvre offers the term **“historical drift”** for explaining tendency for revolutionary situations and positions to be **blown off track**. “[Historical drift is] the gap between effective actions and intentions, and the result of events provoked by tactics and strategies...After turmoil comes calm, drift, and the divisions and gaps” (129-130). While TCI would like to insist that, “In truth, there is no gap between what we are, what we do, and what we are becoming” (TCI, 15), even the most revolutionary intentions may prove to have **reactionary effects**. If the recent appeal of dystopianism in insurrectionary politics may be understood, at least in part, as the historical drift of a Left culture of autonomous utopianism, then TCI should also be wary of historical drift towards right-wing politics.

With this in mind, it is useful to remember that the anti-civilization politics of TCI is part of from a long history of 19th and 20th century anxieties around industrialization. In TCI, nightmarish descriptions of alienated life in the modern metropolis give way to rather romantic pastoral desires, “Our dependence on the metropolis – on its medicine, its agriculture, its police – is so great at present that we can't attack it without putting ourselves in danger” (TCI, 106). What is at stake here is not so much a guerrilla fighting strategy of taking to the hills, but rather a retreat from the metropolis for the cultivation of self-sufficiency. “We must start today, in preparation for the days when we'll need more than just a symbolic portion of our nourishment and care (TCI, 107). The intent then is to create a self-sustained space outside the metropolis in which to learn survival skills, as well as from which to attack the forces of the state and capital congealed in the metropolis. If other forms of utopian de-linking wished to wall themselves off from the world, insurrectionary de-linking is unique in that it aims at intentional confrontation with the metropolis in the event of insurrection, but imagines a space free of capitalist contamination from which to plot and regroup. It is in part, this self-sufficient survivalist twist on the insurrection that makes possible TCI's dismissive attitude towards humanity's future. The friendship-group commune has found do-it-yourself, alternative solutions to meeting life's basic needs (not so unlike the Christian fundamentalist back-to-the-lander stockpiling canned good and ammunition in preparation for Armageddon) and so should you.

The rejection of the modern city and nostalgia for the less alienated life of the countryside is by no means a necessarily Left sentiment. In “Utopia as Replication” Jameson writes of Heidegger's disgust for the urban collectivity of modern life. According to Jameson,

"This ideology expresses a horror of the new industrial city with its new working and white- collar classes, its mass culture and its public sphere, its standardization and its parliamentary systems; and it often implies a nostalgia for the older agriculturalist ways of life” (426).

Might TCI's rejection of mass-based political movements and the modern metropolis, then, be read not necessarily (or at least not only) as a Left-wing position but also as a potentially **reactionary** one? That the industrial (and post-industrial) city may indeed contain elements of the dystopic is not a matter of dispute here. What matters is the political response to these industrial horrors. Of alienated life in the metropolis TCI writes, “It's a paradox that the places thought to be the most uninhabitable turn out to be the only ones still in some way inhabited. An old squatted shack still feels more lived in than the so-called luxury apartments” (TCI, 55). When in the name of an indictment of bourgeois decadence, TCI **romanticizes** poverty as somehow more authentic and alive than their bourgeois counterparts, it not only **betrays a more rigorous understanding** of alienated life under capitalism but also projects utopian desires **backwards** rather than towards a future free of poverty and precarity. Once again, the way out of the impasse of the present appears not as a dialectical transformation into the future but rather a regressive total destruction of “civilization” in favor of the more “authentic” life of the shantytown.

**The alternative is a politics of organizing around the common experience of life shaped by political economy. This starting point creates a mode of solidarity that doesn’t just add categories and stirs but creates an inclusive class identity via struggle that transforms participants.**

Leo **Panitch 18,** York University Canada Research Chair in Comparative Political Economy, From the Streets to the State: Changing The World By Taking Power, pg 26-28

What accounts for the impasse of the left by the late twentieth century? Over the last four decades one of the central tropes of intellectual discourse, epitomized by the popularity of Laclau and Mouffe’s Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, criticizes the strategic mistake of excessively emphasizing class identity and consciousness. Even Geoff Eley’s (2002) monumental historical study, quoted above, which demonstrates how effective socialist labor movements were as advocates for democratic reform, also stresses “the insufficiencies of socialist advocacy,” not least pertaining to gender and race, in terms of “all the ways socialism’s dominance of the Left marginalized issues not easily assimilable to the class-political precepts so fundamental to the socialist vision” (10). **Yet the left’s current conundrum in the face of the new right also brings to light the insufficiencies of the politics of identity, which has not only filled the void of class politics in recent decades but has often played a significant role in shunting class aside**. Adolph Reed Jr. (1999) has perhaps most powerfully made the case for “a politics focused on bringing people together” around the common experience of everyday life shaped and constrained by political economy—for example, finding, keeping or advancing in a job with a living wage, keeping or attaining access to decent healthcare, securing decent, affordable housing. . . . Such concerns and the objective of collectively crafting a vehicle to address them is a politics that proceeds from what we have in common. . . . **To the extent that differences are real and meaningful, the best way to negotiate them is from a foundation of shared purpose and practical solidarity based on a pragmatic understanding of the old principle that an injury to one is an injury to all**. This is not simply a politics that attempts to build on a base in the working class; it **is a politics that in the process can fashion a broadly inclusive class identity**. (xxvii–xxviii) The failure to absorb this strategic insight, which might entail severe costs even for liberal democracy, is becoming ever clearer amidst the reactionary electoral appeal of a new right to working class voters. Nevertheless, this chapter shall argue that it also has much to do with the longstanding problems with the practice of democracy inside the institutions of the labor movement and the political parties with which they were intertwined. It has become far too commonplace to address these problems by criticizing the “ontological” mistake of those theorists who advance a class-oriented politics. **This is a kind of idealism which attributes far too much historical impact to theoretical texts.** It avoids serious inquiry into what determined the actual historical practices of working class parties and unions as democratic institutions. It thereby fails to uncover what really accounts for their limited contribution to the development of workers’ democratic capacities so as to carry the struggle for democracy beyond the electoral arena to the workplace, to the corporations and banks that dominate the economy, and perhaps most important to the democratization of the institutions of the state.

**1NC**

**The United States federal government should restrict anticompetitive mergers in the agriculture sector.**

**Market concentration causes inequity and food shortages in the ag sector.**

Jennifer **Clapp 21**, Professor & Canada Research Chair, Global Food Security & Sustainability, University of Waterloo, "The Problem with Growing Corporate Concentration and Power in the Global Food System," Nature Food, Vol. 2, Issue 6, June 2021, pg. 404-406. edited for clarity.

A relatively small number of transnational firms have come to wield a **high degree of influence** within the global **food system**. Recent years have seen firms all along **agrifood supply chains** merge and acquire one another, to form **giant ‘mega-companies’** that are **central** players in what can only be described as a **profound** reconfiguration of the world food economy. This process is happening in markets for farm inputs, agricultural commodity trading, and food processing and retail1–3. In parts of the global food system where just a few giant firms control a large share of the marketplace, these firms can influence the **types of seeds** farmers plant, what **crops** are grown, what **breeds of livestock** are raised and in what **types of facilities**, **working conditions** for food system workers, and the **types** and **prices** of food items that appear on grocery store shelves, to name just a few examples.

There is long-standing concern that powerful firms in **concentrated** markets are more incentivized to advance the **short-term interests** of their shareholders rather than the **public good**4,5 , a concern that extends to food systems. Civil society groups worry that concentrated agrifood firms might pursue **profit maximization strategies** in ways that **undermine** the livelihoods of small-scale producers, **push up** prices, **limit** product choices and **damage** the environment. As preparations are underway for the 2021 UN Food Systems Summit (UNFSS), which has goals of making food systems more equitable, healthy and sustainable, civil society groups have expressed concern that the Summit agenda does not **sufficiently focus on** the implications of corporate power in food systems6 . This **relative neglect** is especially **puzzling** in the context of growing global concern about the potential harm from concentrated markets in **other sectors**, such as Big Tech. Because food systems are **so important** for multiple reasons—food is a basic need as well as a basic human right, food systems provide livelihoods for nearly a third of humanity, and food systems are intimately connected to ecosystems—it is **imperative** that we have a better understanding of the potential **consequences** of corporate concentration and power in the sector.

**Investigating legal intervention in the agriculture sector opens the toolbox for reconfiguring the broader economic system.**

Renee **Hatcher 19**, Assistant Professor of Law at John Marshall Law School-Chicago, where she serves as the Director of the Community Enterprise and Solidarity Economy Clinic, "Solidarity Economy Lawyering," Tennessee Journal of Race, Gender, & Social Justice, Vol. 8, Issue 23, 2019, Lexis.

"To most public interest-minded law students and lawyers, practicing transactional law isn't an obvious path to saving the world . . . [But] now transactional lawyers are needed, **en masse**, to aid in an **epic reinvention of our economic system**." -- Janelle Orsi 1

An emerging **cohort** of lawyers are working to **transform the dominant economy** from one that centers on **self-interest**, greed, and **profit maximization** to an economy that centers the needs of **people** and the **planet**. These lawyers work in private practice, at legal service organizations, as in-house counsels, clinical professors, and pro-bono volunteers. Their work includes corporate structuring, contract drafting, real estate deals, regulatory advising, and law reform projects, among other things. Their clients are individuals, organizations, small businesses, social enterprises, cooperatives, worker self-directed nonprofits, community land trusts, time banks, and other collective experiments that seek to build alternative mechanisms for both economic justice and social liberation. 2 This is the "solidarity economy" movement, a **growing** movement building a **new economic system** rooted in economic democracy, social solidarity, and environmental sustainability. 3

At the heart of this new economic system are five unifying principles: (1) solidarity, (2) equity in all dimensions (race, gender, ability, etc.), (3) pluralism, (4) participatory democracy, and (5) sustainability. 4 The movement's ultimate vision is twofold, first to grow these values and practices through grassroots initiatives, and second to **link** these solidarity economy activities in a **network of mutual support**, transforming the current **dominant** global economy into a just, democratic, and sustainable economic system. 5 To that end, the core principles are embedded in the organizational and business structures, governance, financing, and the ways in which solidarity economy enterprises and organizations build their **supply chains** and **partnerships**. As a result, solidarity economy lawyers, lawyers that work with solidarity economy clients, often work at the **cutting edge** of corporate law, securities regulations, employment law, licensing, and intellectual property. However, in some cases the current legal regime is **ill suited** for these new types of enterprise. So, while solidarity economy practitioners are reimagining the economy and means of economic exchange, solidarity economy lawyers are attempting to **reimagine the law** to reflect the needs of their clients.

**Externally --- Food insecurity sparks AND drives conflict in numerous hotspots.**

Julian **Cribb 19**, Adjunct Professor, University of Technology, Sydney. Principal, Julian Cribb & Associates. Author, Journalist, Editor & Science Communicator, "Hotspots for Food Conflict in the Twenty-first Century," in Food or War, Chapter 5, 2019, pg. 141-173.

The mounting threat to world peace posed by a **food**, climate and eco**system** increasingly **compromised** and **unstable** was emphasised by the US Director of National Intelligence, Dan Coats, in a briefing to the US Senate in early 2019. ‘Global environmental and ecological degradation, as well as climate change, are likely to fuel competition for **resources**, economic distress, and social discontent through 2019 and beyond’, he said. ‘Climate hazards such as extreme weather, higher temperatures, droughts, floods, wildfires, storms, sea level rise, soil degradation, and acidifying oceans are **intensifying**, threatening infrastructure, health, and water and **food security**. Irreversible damage to ecosystems and habitats will undermine the economic benefits they provide, worsened by air, soil, water, and marine pollution.’ Boldly, Coats delivered his warning at a time when the US President, Trump, was attempting to expunge all reference to climate from government documents.23

Based upon these **recent cases of food conflicts**, and upon the lessons gleaned from the **long**er **history** of the interaction between **food** and **war**, several regions of the planet face a **greatly** heightened **risk of conflict** towards the mid twenty-first century.

Food wars often **start out small**, as mere quarrels over grazing rights, access to wells or as one faction trying to control food supplies and markets. However, if not resolved quickly these disputes can **quickly escalate** into violence, then into **civil conflagrations** which, if not quelled, can in turn explode into **crises that reverberate around the planet** in the form of **soaring prices**, floods of **refugees** and the **involvement of major powers** – which in turn carries the **risk of transnational war**. The danger is magnified by **swollen populations**, the effects of **climate change**, depletion of **key** resources such as water, topsoil and nutrients, the collapse of **ecosystem services** that support agriculture and fisheries, universal **pollution**, a **widening** gap between rich and poor, and the rise of **vast megacities** unable to feed themselves (Figure 5.3).

**1NC---Case**

**Pragmatic consequentialism is prerequisite to queer flourishing---the framework their links assume is a paranoid reading that interrupts queer becoming.**

Adam **Greteman 18**. Department of Art Education, School of the Art Institute of Chicago. “On Reading Practices: Where Pragmatism and Queer Meet,” Sexualities and Genders in Education pp 37-65, Springer.

I want to attend to the reading practices that inform my own work here to be transparent to my readers, but also provide lessons on the different ways in which “theory” informs reading as a practice. I first came to think about reading practices through pragmatism—not queer theory. For some this might seem rather unqueer. There has been little written looking at the ways in which pragmatism and queer theory could be productive together, although I’ve tried (Greteman & Wojcikiewicz, 2014). Nor have pragmatists in general taken up a queer project, despite pragmatism being a little queer. That’s neither here nor there. What is of interest to me in this chapter are reading practices. As Cleo Cherryholmes (1999) illustrated, reading is more than meets the eye. Pragmatism itself is, as well, more than meets the eye. Pragmatism presents a particular form of reading that attends to action. I dwell on pragmatism here to reveal my own pragmatic leanings. **I like pragmatism**. I also tend to read things I like as I sense, as argued elsewhere, there are pedagogies and politics tied to liking (Greteman & Burke, 2017). Cherryholmes (1999) began Reading Pragmatism, noting that the reason to engage pragmatism was “that pragmatism **looks to the consequences** that we **endlessly bump up against**” (p. 3). And we **bump up against consequences all day**, **every day**. Those consequences are the results of things we—ourselves and others—have done as well as things far outside of our control. “Pragmatists conceptualize the world where we, all of us,” Cherryholmes argued, “are constantly thrown forward as the present approaches but never quite reaches the future” (p. 3). It is, in his estimation, “a discourse that attempts to bridge where we are with where we might end up” (p. 3). A key word, of course, being “might,” as pragmatism **cannot predict what will come**, but attends to **contemplating conceivably what might come**. We don’t know what will come, but we suspect we will come in some way to a future. Pragmatism is less a theory. Instead, it is a **way of doing things in the world** attending to the **conceivable consequences** of our actions. Queers come in the world, and in coming they **encounter consequences**, and **not just theoretically**. I sense pragmatism’s attention to consequences is important decades into the existence of various queer theories that have offered readings of various types of objects—films, performances, novels, policies, experiences, and more. Those readings—once scandalous in the academy—have now become part of the academy. They have in infiltrating the institutions they once critiqued or parodied or subverted become practices that **can inform work** that more, now than ever, has the backing of the institution . And, with such institutionalization we can more, now than ever, contemplate the conceivable consequences of queer theory and its attendant practices. We might now be able to think about if and how queer theories **have had** and **could continue to have consequences** for the worlds we inhabit—through **discourse**, **material practices**, and **more**. What are the **conceivable consequences of various types of queer readings**? What do such readings do for readers as those readers encounter the daily work of living? This is a question I will hopefully provide responses to throughout the remainder of this book as I contemplate how queer theory—as I have read and encountered it—has allowed me to contemplate queer thriving. Reading is—this might seem obvious—contingent and contextual. It is informed by our time, objects we have encountered, relationships we have had, and much more. Our readings are not, nor can they be, ahistorical. They will become dated, outdated even, becoming instead signs of a time gone by. Such times gone by might be read—in the present—as a sign of progress. See, things have gotten better as texts written years ago show things were pretty shitty. However, such times might also be read nostalgically as a time one wished one had lived in. “Wow, the 1970s sound fabulous! What happened to us?” I will, I suspect fall into reading things as signs of progress and nostalgically. I hope you’ll forgive me, but I think progress and nostalgia can serve us in various ways. Theoretical traditions serve us in various ways as well. Different theoretical traditions have offered different ways of reading texts . Cherryholmes (1999) illustrated this by providing readings that take an “authoritative” perspective or are informed by deconstruction, new historicism, and, of course pragmatism. This move was pedagogical, providing readers with a strategy to distinguish between related, but different, reading practices. Reading practices, Cherryholmes illustrated, have different consequences for how a text impacts readers and beyond. In addition, his readings illustrated distinctions between particular critical traditions (under the banner of poststructuralism and postmodernism) and pragmatism . Cherryholmes argued: Poststructural and postmodern investigations tend to be investigatory, interpretive, critical, and analytic. They are **not forward-looking**. They are oriented to **commentary** and **criticism** instead of **consequences** and **action**. Poststructuralism and its postmodern relatives **do not have a project that looks to action**, nor do they seek one. (p. 4) “Pragmatism,” as an alternative, “looks to results” (p. 4) but **not just any results**. The products of pragmatic readings “are **never finished**. They are **interpreted**, **reinterpreted**, and **criticized indefinitely**” (p. 4). Continuing, Cherryholmes wrote, “as a result, [pragmatic readings] are **continually open to new experiences** and **problems** and **opportunities**. Pragmatist productions deconstruct, they do indeed. And their deconstruction invites, indeed requires, revision and replacement” (p. 4). Pragmatism and its readings embrace the interpretive, analytic, critical options provided by poststructuralism. They are, I think, more alike than they are different. However, pragmatism **moves beyond** poststructuralism and postmodernism to **contemplate action**, to **roll with the punches** in order to **make decisions about how to do things in the world**. I have, I sense, quoted rather liberally from Cherryholmes above so let me provide my reading. Poststructural and postmodern theories—in which queer theory would be included—do interesting and important work. They deconstruct, interpret, provoke with their readings. They play with words and read against the grain. The work they do is critical since they seek, in part, to expose injustices. Additionally, their work is interpretive, as they do not propose Truth, but offer truths. They are also primarily backward looking. They look back at texts to expose or reveal in those texts their limitations or how the text deconstructs, or how texts illustrate the formation of things. What such ways of readings **fail** to do (and every reading does some things well and other things less well) is to **look forward to the consequences** of what they are doing. Deconstructionists or new historicists have not immediately been interested or concerned with contemplating the possible consequences of their readings, although I suspect they are not unconcerned with consequences; being “critical” would imply a certain interest in consequences. Pragmatism on the other hand is forward looking. It **attends to the conceivable consequences** of its readings. Reading—with a pragmatic bent—is an exercise in **reading into the conceivable future** that could be the result of actions. It **gathers together**, **assembles**, **conceivable consequences** of doing this, that, or another thing in the world. And this **requires interpretive** and **imaginative thinking**. This generally seems rather wishy-washy. How do we determine conceivable consequences? What types of results are we looking for? And what limits help us “conceive” the conceivable? And how do we make choices about what results and consequences we want to help bring to fruition? These are, as Cherryholmes illustrated, important questions to ask and questions that are answered carefully. We seek results that are fulfilling, we decide inclusively, we expose our ideas to multiple interpretations and criticism so as to deal with the ever-changing realities we encounter. We do, in a sense, the work we often are already doing living in the world, except we do so attentively. Such answers are, to be clear, not “idealistic,” rather: At the beginning and end of the day pragmatists are realists because they value what happens. They are interested in results, in consequences. They understand that pragmatist experiments are social constructions. These constructions come from experience and ideas and knowledge and power. Proposed material/ideal and realistic/idealistic distinctions deconstruct because the material conditions in which we find ourselves contribute to and shape what we can conceptualize and enact. Pragmatists try to bring about beautiful results in the midst of power and oppression and ignorance . (Cherryholmes, 1999, p. 5) Pragmatism **accepts the contingent realities** that we face in our everyday lives where we **have to make choices**. And those choices are **informed** and **limited** in all kinds of ways. We **cannot base our decisions on some foundation** or **truth**. Pragmatism is “anti-foundational” since such foundations and “Truth” are **already conditioned** and **constructed**. Rather, pragmatism makes its decisions attending to consequences that are **satisfying** and **fulfilling** within the **complex milieu** where we come to understand those very concepts themselves. It exists in the present, is informed by the past, with an eye toward a beautiful future. Reparative Readings Pragmatism—in looking forward —attends to contemplating pleasure and beauty as desired consequences of our actions. Pragmatism is, I suggest, an approach **committed to bringing into existence positive affects** and **actions**. This is something **decidedly different** from most critical traditions. Most critical traditions, as Eve Sedgwick (2004) aptly argued, embrace a **hermeneutics of suspicion** and this embrace, by the start of the twenty-first century, had become a problem. Sedgwick was concerned that there was a wide spread habit within critical work to engage a hermeneutics of suspicion. And while such hermeneutics—what she calls “paranoid” reading—is an important reading practice, there is a **side effect** when such reading practices become **habitual**. Critical theorists—variously situated in queer, feminist, race-conscious, and related theories—for Sedgwick , “may have made it **less rather than more possible** to unpack the **local**, **contingent relations** between any given piece of knowledge and its narrative/epistemological entailments for the seeker, knower, or teller” (p. 124). Paranoid reading, while **excellent at exposing things** may, in becoming a “**mandatory injunction rather than a possibility** among other possibilities,” **limit encountering**, **intervening**, and **creating other possibilities**. Or put differently, if we are **mandated to do particular types of readings to be considered critical**, we become **limited in the work that we can do**. We find ourselves always looking over our shoulder, paranoid about what enemies are chasing us without looking ahead to things that could trip us up (a paranoid option) or provide us support against our enemies. Reading practices, I hope you see, are never neutral, but always bring with them assumptions and viewpoints about what counts and what does not count. Reading practices inform what we look at, how we look, and where we look. They inform why we look at all. Reading practices **frame the world before us** and, just as a “frame” does, it sets us up to see (or be seen) in particular ways. Frames—like our reading practices—limn the scene for better and for worse. There are **always frames**, one task is to begin to **see different frames** and what they do for the objects they capture within the borders and what they, then, by definition, exclude. Sedgwick illustrated that queer reading practices, by and large, took up a paranoid position, which made sense. Within the history of sexuality, she argued, there was a clear relationship between homosexuality and paranoia. Homosexuality, as theorized by Freud, was connected to paranoia and anti-homophobic inquiries in a similar vein took up the paranoid position, in an attempt to expose the violence of, for instance, heteronormativity (Warner, 1991) or homonormativity (Duggan, 2002) or homonationalism (Puar, 2007). The paranoid position was critical to resistance as it assisted in recognizing and exposing the enemies to queer lives and practices not only at the interpersonal level, but at the cultural, institutional, and disciplinary levels.1 However, as Sedgwick aptly noted, “just because you have enemies doesn’t mean you have to be paranoid” (p. 127). “Indeed,” Sedgwick continued, “for someone to have an unmystified view of systemic oppression **does not intrinsically** or necessarily **enjoin that person** to any specific train of epistemological or narrative consequences” (p. 127). Recognizing the realities of oppressions—in their diversity—**does not require** that one engage in a **particular type of critical project**. In fact, **limiting oneself to a particular type of project** would **eliminate the possibility of surprise**. Instead, it would leave readers over time with the sense that they are being **beat over the head with a bat of the same information**. “There’s oppression. Do you see the oppression? Do you see the oppression? It is there, there is the oppression. Do you see it?” This type of exposure is, as Sedgwick noted, a central tenet of paranoid reading practices. However, as she noted “[paranoid strategies] represent a way, among other ways, of seeking, finding, and organizing knowledge” (p. 130). And to be clear, there are important things that paranoid strategies do. Pointing out and exposing oppression is important. However, there are also important things that such strategies fail to adequately address; this being a lesson the tunnel of oppression I addressed in the preface taught me early on. The tunnel of oppression was rooted in exposing, but the moment it sought to promote, to assemble objects that did different work, its work became contested. As an alternative to paranoid reading, but not as a replacement, Sedgwick developed what she called **reparative reading**, arguing that “to read from a reparative position is to surrender the knowing, anxious paranoid determination that no horror, however apparently unthinkable, shall ever come to the reader as new” (p. 146). To read from a reparative position is to allow for the **possibility of surprise** and leave open space that **things could be different**. This is “because the reader has **room to realize** that the future **may be different from the present**” (p. 146). Additionally, she continued, “it is also possible for her to entertain such profoundly relieving, ethically critical possibilities as that the past, in turn, could have happened differently from the way it actually did” (p. 146). Reparative reading practices—embracing the contingent and positive—similarly to pragmatism, are concerned with how things could be different. There is with Sedgwick’s reparative readings, like Cherryholmes’s pragmatism, an opening for work looking forward done under the banner of queer theory. Queers **do not have to maintain** and **be determined** by their historical connection to paranoid positions, but can **invent additional ways** of positioning themselves in and against the world. Such a move makes sense as it recognizes the changing realities and needs of queers.

**Opaque, immanent insurrection poses only fleeting and ineffective challenges, degrades into right-wing reactionary politics, and trades-off with organized praxis that’s more effective in responding to state violence**

Dr. Marla **Zubel 13**, Ph.D. in Comparative Literature from the University of Minnesota, Twin Cities, Now Professor of English at Western Kentucky University, BA in Literature and Sociology from the University of California, Santa Cruz, “The Utopian Catastrophism of Insurrectionary Politics”, The New Everyday – A Media Commons Project, 2-21, <http://mediacommons.org/tne/pieces/utopian-catastrophism-insurrectionary-politics#sdfootnote2sym> [TCI = The Coming Insurrection]

Following Lukács, it is possible to see how TCI may provide a compelling, if not graphic, description of the state of the world and yet **fall short** in its strategic response – offering only the arbitrary demand of insurrection which confronts history as something alien and thus beyond saving. Lukács rightly identifies the counter-revolutionary logic of such a position, which reproduces “the inhumanity of class society on a metaphysical and religious plane” (190). The ‘revolutionary’ utopianism of such views,” he claims, “cannot break out of the inner limits set to this undialectical ‘humanism'” (191).

From nihilism to utopianism to “undialectical humanism,” accusing the theoretical framework of TCI of reactionary tendencies in terms of its arrested dialectics is perhaps overly uncharitable. The recent popular uprisings in the Arab World, Europe and now the United States may offer compelling examples of insurrectionary politics in action. The Invisible Committee's efforts to make comprehensible these insurrections and the forces they fight against is both politically necessary and intellectually admirable. The ability of these insurrectionary events to break from and reset the social and economic conditions of our world is still to be determined, but certainly these moments of rupture – the negating rage of the insurrectionary event as “propaganda by deed” – may yet hold the potential to coalesce into large-scale revolution. In that regard the political manifesto-as-field-guide that is TCI may prove timely and useful.

But, if texts like TCI, **masquerading** as a break from the dead-end of anti-globalization utopianism, **discourage** thinking through the contradictions of the present, a present which necessarily by virtue of these contradictions offers, or at least motions towards, a way out, it provides **little** by way of a revolutionary **strategy**. More significantly perhaps, its political **ambiguities** may actually encourage it to **drift into more reactionary, right-wing political territory**, as we have seen lately with the rise of the anti-statist Tea Party movement in the U.S, and the right-wing libertarian threat to blow the Occupy impulse off course. Furthermore, TCI's **anti-organizing attitude** of **invisibility** risks **digging its own grave** in the form of the “commune,” which can do **no more** than attack and **retreat** before finally being **quietly dealt with** by the violence of the state. Invisibility might **not be a strength** after all.

The way out of the impasse of the present moment is **not** through the dark corridors of insurrectionary nihilist-utopianism. While there is much to admire in TCI's attempt at a thorough diagnosis of the contemporary state of civilization, its failure to **work through** the contradictions of the present and thus to articulate a **truly revolutionary praxis** of **not only negation** but also **dialectically mediated transformation**, ultimately leaves it **impotent** to overcome the very crisis it aims to attack. Despite TCI's insistence to the contrary, the **only solution** to the crisis will have to be a **social one**.

**Eliminating the state causes corporate fill-in---private groups will ramp up exploitation in far worse ways**

Noam **Chomsky 98**, Professor of Linguistics – MIT, The Common Good: Noam Chomsky Interviewed by David Barsamian, p. 84-85

So Argentina is “minimizing the state”–cutting down public expenditures, the way our government is doing, but much more extremely. Of course, **when you minimize the state, you maximize something else –and it isn’t popular control. What gets maximized is private power**, domestic and foreign. I met with a very lively anarchist movement in Buenos Aires, and with other anarchist groups as far away as northeast Brazil, where nobody even knew they existed. We had a lot of discussions about these matters. They recognize that they have to try to use the state--even though they regard it as totally illegitimate. The reason is perfectly obvious. When you eliminate the one institutional structure in which people can participate to some extent--namely the government--you're simply handing over power to **unaccountable private tyrannies** that are **much worse**. So you have to make use of the state, all the time recognizing that you ultimately want to eliminate it. Some of the rural workers in Brazil have an interesting slogan. They say their immediate task is "expanding the floor of the cage." They understand that they're trapped inside a cage, but realize that protecting it when it's under attack from even worse predators on the outside, and extending the limits of what the cage will allow, are both essential preliminaries to dismantling it. If they attack the cage directly when they're so vulnerable, they'll get murdered. That's something that anyone ought to be able to understand who can keep two ideas in their head at once, but some people here in the US tend to be so **rigid** and **doctrinaire** that they don’t understand the point. But unless the left here is willing to tolerate that level of complexity, we’re not going to be of any use to people who are suffering and need our help—or, for that matter, to ourselves.

**Collapse of the state causes violence and warlordism, not emancipation**

Hussein **Solomon 96**, Senior Researcher in the Human Security Project – Institute for Defence Policy, “In Defence of Realism”, African Security Review, 5(2), http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/5No2/5No2/InDefence.html

To emphasise the point, both brutally and simply, there is **no practical alternative** to the State. Walker says that "[t]he state is a political category in a way that the world, or the globe, or the planet, or humanity is not."106 Also stressing the centrality of the State, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali observes: "The **foundation-stone** of this work [ie. peace and economic development] is and must remain the State. Respect for its fundamental sovereignty and integrity are crucial to any common international progress."107 But, the most powerful argument for the State comes not from its many and varied successes, but rather from its failure. State collapse, as in Somalia, has not been met by cries of jubilation from its ‘emancipated’ inhabitants as Booth would have us believe.108 Rather, **tragedy and misery has greeted** Somalians with its **collapse**. This is why the State must and should remain the primary referent in domestic and international affairs. The principle of state sovereignty is the most plausible way of reconciling claims about the universal and the particular, society and the individual. Without the apparatus of a strong state, the way becomes clear for the Mohammed Farah Aideeds of the world to appear. **Without the** apparatus of a strong **state, the world will be plunged into** Somali-style **warlordism of the Dark Age variety**.

**Engaging hegemonic politics is key to prevent imminent acts of violence---this tactical usage doesn’t result in cooption.**

Alexandros **Kioupkiolis 14**. Lecturer at the School of Political Sciences, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Greece. 2014. “Radical Democracy and Collective Movements Today: The Biopolitics of the Multitude Versus the Hegemony of the People.” pp 158-166.

In effect, the pertinence of hegemonic logics for an effective self-organization of the multitude is conceded by the very advocates of non-hegemonic multitudinous politics, Hardt and Negri, in their latest Declaration (2012). Sketching the outlines of a constituent process that can advance the common freedom of the many today, they reasonably ask (Hardt and Negri 2012: 56): 'What good is a **beautiful constituent process** when people are **suffering** now? What if, by the time we create a **perfect democratic society**, the earth is already **degraded beyond repair?**' Any constituent powers must be equipped with a host of democratic 'counterpowers' that will take **immediate action** in various areas of **urgent need** in order to ward off environmental degradation and to address basic human necessities (food, shelter, health etc.). To this end, the counterpowers will deploy the legal means of national and international law, as well as **'weapons of coercion'** so as to 'force the corporations and the nation-states to open access to the common' and to stop natural and social destruction (Hardt and Negri 2012: 59). In their conclusion (Hardt and Negri 2012: 101-3), they vociferously acknowledge, moreover, that the rich will not give away their property and the powerful will not let the reins of power fall of their own free will. To overturn the ruling powers we will need force, and we should prepare for an event that will 'completely reshuffle the decks of political powers and possibility' (Hardt and Negri 2012: 102). In other words, what is required is a new balance of power that can be attained through the forceful assertion of the multitude in an event of rupture. And this refiguring of the plexus of power lies at the core of any hegemonic demarche on its most classic, Gramscian conception (Gramsci 1971: 57-8, 109, 172, 404).4 Moreover, a democratic society grounded in the open sharing and self¬management of the 'commons' will need to forge coalitions between the defenders of such a project and a variety of groups in struggle - workers, unemployed, poor, students, people opposing racial and gender hierarchies (Hardt and Negri 2012: 106--7). Furthermore, such blocs of forces should not come together as a tactical alliance of separate identities and organizations, but they should build alliances in which autonomous singularities interact with each other, transform themselves through their exchanges, draw inspiration from one another and recognize themselves as 'part of a common project' (Hardt and Negri 2012: 107). That is, the logic of difference should be supplemented with a logic of equivalence which unfolds around a common identity, in Laclau's terms, and forms a community of passion and understanding, in Gramsci's account (1971: 333,418). 4 Antonio Negri has explicitly affirmed the need for a 'hegemony of one pole' - 'the common of the multitude' - 'that has been subordinated over another which has been dominant until now' (Curcio and Ozselcuk 2010: 322). Finally, Hardt and Negri (2012: 82-3) single out a certain dialectic between movements and recent 'progressive governments' in Latin America and foreground it as an exemplary instance of an 'institutionality of the common'. Democratic decision-making practices direct here **plural processes** of transparent and flexible governance, **allying effective counterpowers** with **autonomous, long-term political developments** and the ethico-political elaboration of a new democratic constitution. In this paradigmatic apparatus of open, plural and egalitarian self-government, radical movements **hold on to their organizational and ideological autonomy**. They maintain co-operative **and** antagonistic relations with governments which support programmatically the same project and form part of the same system of common governance. They conduct **common battles** against **various hierarchies** but they turn **against** state administrations and ruling parties that claim to represent them when the latter **relapse** into old practices of domination. This mode of disjunctive conjunction between movements and parties¬governments may indeed mark a radical break with the hegemonic, socialist or populist, subsumption of social movements under a centralized party with ideological homogeneity (Hardt and Negri 2012: 81, 83). However, even though such an agonistic interaction **dilutes sovereign power** into a complex plurality of deliberative moments and consensual law-making initiatives, it is said to preserve 'nonetheless a **deep** political **coherence** of the governmental process' which establishes a consistent 'institutionality of the common' (Hardt and Negri 2012: 82). If this is so, the government must partly represent in the state the interests and political orientations of the social movements, otherwise the 'deep coherence' of governance would be a sham. In other words, representation remains intrinsic to this modality of political rule, which seeks to exert the hegemonic power of an allied historic bloc over other social forces insofar it wages a common battle 'against national oligarchies, international corporations, or racist elites' (Hardt and Negri 2012: 81-2). By the same token, the disjunctive alliance of movements and ruling parties is yet another incarnation of the hegemonic dialectic between universality and particularity. The entire bloc that enacts the 'institutionality of the common' does not coincide with society as a whole to the extent that it wields its power against opposing social forces. Accordingly, it stands for a particularity which assumes the role of universality (of the 'common') without encompassing the whole in its entirety. Laclau's 'uneven power', 'logic of equivalence', 'representation' and the dialectic of 'particularity/universality' are alive and kicking amidst the constituent politics of the multitude. Beyond the figure of an emancipatory, egalitarian and internally diverse multitude as canvassed by Hardt and Negri and beyond the schemes of social mobilization and self-government as adumbrated in actual mobilizations, it seems that at least three dimensions of hegemonic politics should be upheld in contemporary movements which strive for the construction of autonomous and equal associations. On the reasonable assumption that entrenched interests, plutocrats and established oligarchies will not forsake **voluntarily** their power, their property and their privileges, it will be necessary, first, to **pursue hegemony** as a struggle to **reconfigure the** existing **composition of forces** and to replace it with a **different power structure** that will strain to **minimize** domination, hierarchies and **exclusions**. Residues of uneven, centralized power might also subsist within the collective self-administration of the commons, as in the example of open source communities. The effective management of the codes which are freely accessible to all combines the voluntary contributions of a potentially unlimited community of users evincing variable degrees of experience and interest with a committed core of key developers who responsibly oversee the process of developing a prominent version of the code (Ljungberg 2000, Valverde and Sole 2007, Leadbeater 2009). Second, even if one envisages **freer**, plural and egalitarian **worlds**, and the struggles to realize them, in terms of multiple interlocking and conflicting **assemblages**, rather than as a global system or a united revolutionary front, a variable degree of **hegemony** as **collective** unity-cohesion will be still needed to avoid mutually destructive **collisions** and incompatibilities. This would be redundant only if social and individual differences cohered spontaneously with each other, and ruinous conflicts could be magically averted without much effort. Third, relations of representation and the dialectics of particularity/universal, whereby a particular force takes on universal tasks and speaks in the name of the whole, will be reproduced in any association in which the will of the many does not coincide with the will of all. Such a congruence is not logically inconceivable, but it is empirically unlikely in societies of free, diverse and self-differentiating singularities where no universal reason, nature or homogeneous tradition guarantees the collective convergence of different understandings, values and pursuits in political interactions. However, even if it displays the formal traits of unequal power, unification and representation, a contemporary hegemony of **self-organized multiplicities** of singularities will **break through** many in egalitarian, heteronomous and **oppressive fixations of hegemony** in Gramsci's and Laclau's guise, subverting hegemonic politics from within **and** without. Let us begin with vertical, uneven power relations. Against the ruling force of a party guided by 'generals' (Gramsci 1971: 153), against the cohesive function of leaders and near-autonomous representatives, and against the sheer emphasis on the need for power asymmetries (Laclau 1996: 43, 54-7, 2000: 207-12), the egalitarian politics of the many seeks today a horizontal, non-hierarchical collective organization in networks that foster the equal participation of all, dismissing party bureaucracies, leaders and top-down representation. The potential persistence or re-emergence of hierarchies and relations of domination due to unequal capabilities, and the eventual failure to achieve a violence-free consensus should not be seen as a fatal condition to which we should resign ourselves. They should be regarded, rather, as an always present risk and possibility against which free collectives should raise awareness and institute various procedures of contest and struggle, striving for the maximum possible degree of equal freedom. Variable forms of centralization could be endorsed by autonomous multiplicities, such as general assemblies which coordinate many smaller assemblies and diverse mobilizations, or groups of committed participants in open collective processes that manage common resources in close exchange with the wider communities which they serve. There can be variable hybridizations of verticality, concentration and horizontality in open egalitarian multitudes. But the prevalent presumption will be against closures, hierarchies and leaders, and there should be a permanent movement in favour of opening access and equalizing power in effective practices of collective self-governance. To the extent that asymmetries of power are always likely to crop up again, or insofar as they may be pertinent and expedient under particular conditions, full horizontality cannot be a permanent state but an horizon of ongoing struggle against residues of uneven, top-down and concentrated power. Egalitarian multitudes will embody then disjunctive combinations of horizontality and verticality, whereby each will blend uneasily with the other, mutually contesting and redressing their limitations. But universally open participation and symmetrical power will be ranked higher in the order of priorities. The pursuit of direct democracy for all, the struggle against sovereign leaders and the expansion of active engagement in collective self-governance are found at the cutting edge of contemporary democratic movements, while they are ostensibly lacking in hegemonic politics a la Gramsci and Laclau. Uneven power will have to be wielded against the opponents of a radical democracy of the multitudes, both during the struggles to establish it and in order to sustain and enhance it thereafter. But the enemies of equal and plural self-organization will be the defenders of vested interests, hierarchies and exclusions, that is, collective power will be used against the agents of domination. Forceful 'counterpowers' will need to be deployed against obdurate elites for the common re-appropriation of the commons and for arresting natural degradation. But no sovereign power should enforce its schemes of egalitarian self-management on dissidents and unwilling others, as this runs counter to the very idea of autonomous self-organization. And any processes of sovereign rule within egalitiarian multiplicities will endeavour to disperse, pluralize and dilute sovereignty among various sites of collective governance, seeking consensus and negotiation among fairly equal parties rather than the concentration of force around some of them. Moving on to the unity of the hegemonic bloc - its mode of composition - the affirmation of diversity and autonomous constituent practices in the 'newest social movements' (Day 2005) suggests a principle of unity that clashes head-on with Gramsci's intellectual, moral, political and economic homogeneity imposed on the whole by leading groups and the state (1971: 152-3, 181-2, 239,244,266,333,418). The new principle of free and egalitarian pluralization in the modes of association, in participatory economies and so on is encapsulated in a famous saying of the Zapatistas: 'One no, many yeses': one no to the global hegemony of neoliberal capitalism, many yeses to the figures of free and equal societies we want to create in different parts of the world. The need for cohesion and the commitment to equal freedom will set limits to the scope of possible and acceptable diversity. But the ultimate bounds will not be fully settled in advance and the aim will be to accommodate the maximum degree of willed collective divergences, beyond any universal orthodoxy or any forceful imposition of 'ideal freedom'. The composition of differences will not be dictated by abstract, a priori laws. It will be shaped through the intercourse, conflict and participation of all societies of freedom that interact in the same network of extended relations. This will negotiate a flexible unity of praxis rather than a rigid unity of ideology or a fixed universal constitution. In the insurrections of the indignados and the OWS, collective identity was not rooted in a common ideology or a fixed political program. It was constantly produced through communication and engagement in a political process which sought to agglutinate differences and to attain provisional agreement on common or parallel actions. In such practices of collective deliberation, difference is not a given that can only be aggregated with other prefixed preferences; differences are dynamic divergences which can be redefined and may find new points of convergence. They proceed together under the common banners of quasi-empty signifiers such as 'Real democracy' or 'We are the 99%', which are variously signifiable by different actors and remain subject to ongoing re-signification through continuous political interaction. These common signifiers do not function as the war flags of party generals who seek to recruit more soldiers to their struggle for hegemony, pursuing their set plans. Finally, representation and leadership by 'representatives'. This is another constitutive structure of hegemony which is radically upset and reconfigured in multitudinous militancy today. True, the 'activist minorities' which set up encampments in the Mediterranean central squares and, later on, in North America spoke in the name of the 'people' or the 99 per cent, although they fell far short of a popular majority. But this modality of representation shares very little with instituted forms of political representation in liberal democracies. Representatives do not make up a closed elite club nor do they set themselves apart from society, yielding sovereign power over those they are supposed to represent. The mobilized minorities in question open sites of collective involvement and political deliberation, which offer access to any and all on equal terms. The general assemblies in the encampments functioned as common pools of collective self-management which were freely available to all, without any fixed leadership and exclusionary formal rules. In their capacity as collective representatives, these assemblies make representation accessible to the active engagement and the widening influence of the 'represented' - the broader society or the people that they stand for. They depersonalize representation, whose function is assumed by anonymous, mobile and shifting crowds. As a result, no individual representatives are vested with formally entrenched sovereign powers and any citizen can get involved in the process. The 'leadership' that could be exercised by such movements over society is not only collective but also receptive to all, participatory, mutable and reversible, staging a singular marriage of representative with direct democracy. Alain Badiou (2012: 58-62) has argued that militant collective mobilizations which occupy public sites display an intensification of subjective energy. They make the 'people' publicly present and they proclaim universal political 'truths' ('real democracy now', 'we are all free and equal', and so on). But they are always minoritarian compared to the silent, inert majorities of abstaining individuals in the various societies in which they surge up. However, their intensity and their localized, compact presence make them certain that they represent the country's people as a whole, so much so that nobody can publicly deny it. The totality is represented by 'contraction', and the activist minority 'possess an accepted authority to proclaim that the historical destiny of the country . . . is them' (Badiou 2012: 60), rendering all questions of adequate representation irrelevant. This claim may have some merit when it comes to short-term, high-intensity collective politics. But it is deeply controversial as a general tack to grass¬roots egalitarian self-government, insofar as it has an activist, anonymous and unaccountable minority rule over a silent and absent majority. Indeed, a standing commitment to full **political engagement** in **all** the **fields** of the 'commons' (technical infrastructures, natural resources, culture, common affairs at large) is hardly imaginable for the vast majority in the long run. But the challenge we are facing is to **bind** together the energetic and direct democratic 'contraction' of the people with **political** processes of **accountability** and institutional control by society at large. Through such procedures, the dismantling of alienated sovereign representation and the institution of assemblies of collective **self-governance** open to all could be coupled with circuits of communication and **answerability** to social majorities, preventing the rise of **new elites of committed activists** and fomenting **political fermentation**, exchange, contest and variable degrees of participation across wider swathes of the population. In this way, a political association of the multitude could not only come to grips with residues of hegemonic politics in its midst. It could also fuel the relentless subversion of hierarchies, closures and new patterns of domination from within, holding out the prospect of a world beyond hegemony in a universe still bridled with it.

**Cooption links more to them than us post-Trump**

Cynthia **Weber 16**, Professor of International Relations at the University of Sussex, “Sovereignty, Sexuality And The Will To Trump: A Queer IR Analysis And Response,” 11-27-2016, https://thedisorderofthings.com/2016/11/27/sovereignty-sexuality-and-the-will-to-trump-a-queer-ir-analysis-and-response/

Crucially, the Trump campaign didn’t just roll out its vision of this ‘US sovereign subject’ by employing either/or logics, even though much of the time this seemed to be the case. Yes, Trump pitted ‘trustworthy’ and ‘untrustworthy’ US citizens against one another. But he constantly flip flopped on who these trustworthy and untrustworthy citizens were, whether in the case of women, ‘the blacks’ or the first black President of the United States of America. The campaign also rolled out Mike Pence to deny many of the things Trump said. And Trump made a lot of inherently contradictory statements that suggested he was for and against some groups or policies at the same time. For example, Trump said, ‘There can be no discrimination against gays. I’m against gay marriage’ (although in his 60 Minutes interview, Trump said gay marriage was a legally settled issue). Trump also made inconsistent statements about the anti-trans\* bathroom law in North Carolina. Comments like these were implicitly and explicitly made in the register of sex, **gender** and sexuality throughout the campaign, and they were more consistent with and/or logics and neither/nor logics than they were with either/or logics. These statements demonstrate how some of **the paradoxical figures and logics found in queer discourses were coopted** by the Trump campaign for its own purposes. All of this left many politicians, pundits, and ordinary US American citizens wondering if Trump was a clown who should be laughed off or an existential threat to the American democratic project. Trump positioned himself as either and both and even neither as it suited his ambitions. And he will likely continue to do so as the 45th President of the United States. What is to be done? As the US and the world face up to the realities of the impossible Presidency that the Trump campaign made possible, there is no shortage of recommendations circulating in critical camps about what is to be done. These include: Organizing new coalitions and devising experimental techniques to make them effective; **Disarming** the **specific modalities of citizenship, governance and reason** that make (un)reasonable identifications with a will to Trump possible; and **Resisting all** xenophobias, forms of **racism**, **misogyny**, **homo/bi/trans\*phobias**, and other oppressive ideologies and social relations that violently order the world in whatever name – be it **white supremacy**, **rightwing nationalism**, conservatism, or **neoliberalism**. I am **less hopeful** than Joan Cocks might be that these **new political alliances and institutions will be forged ‘without sovereign aspirations, delusions, or pretensions’, whatever their scale**. And I may be more persuaded than Cocks is that the **counter-Trump re-imaginings of the US** that will support these political alliances and institutions are **an essential part of what makes radical change possible, even if these re-imaginings fail to escape the ‘delusion of sovereignty’ and its corresponding delusions of things like sex, gender and sexuality**. This, it seems to me, is **something Trump’s radical re-imagining of the US as his platform for winning the White House underscores**. As we all move forward and ready ourselves for some difficult conversations, this queer IR analysis suggests we keep the following two points in mind. First, connections between sovereignty, sex, gender and sexuality are neither academic nor trivial. Nor are they separable from racisms, xenophobias and other systems of power. How sovereignties are specifically sexualized, racialized, classed and otherwise configured to authorize the defense of particular nationalisms and internationalisms has real effects on real people. This is as true in relation to the hate speech and physical violence authorized in the name of Trump as it is for the policies that will emerge from a Trump administration. Second, **exclusively anti-normative, always contrarian, somehow liberating understandings** of ‘queer’, ‘queers’, and ‘queer logics’ can **obscure** the fact that ‘queer’ – just like **any (dis)position, strategy, or tool – can be captured, mimicked, and mobilized** to map the world in despicable ways. **Alt-Right** offers one important example of a white supremacist organization **adopting techniques of the left** for such purposes. How the Trump campaign **mobilized what (otherwise) might appear to be queer logics of statecraft to de-normalize Clinton’s ‘neoliberal US sovereign subject’ on behalf of Trump’s (re)normalized ‘repressed, entitled, white US sovereign subject’** is another. **There is no reason to believe that, as President, Trump will abandon the very logics and tactics that helped win** him the Presidency. These are among the stakes a queer IR analysis of a will to Trump makes plain. For me, **opposing a will to Trump** starts by reminding myself that – like ‘queer’ – a ‘state’s sovereign subjectivity is…”[i]llusive, always on the move.” It is “at best like something, but it never is that something”’. Trump is of some ever-changing United States of America, but Trump is not the United States of America. The same can be said of the ‘US sovereign subject’ Trump’s campaign strategically figured to authorize Trump’s will to power. It is in these gaps and fissures where I will pitch my political tent and stage my **practical political resistance** to a will to Trump.

**Liberalism can be re-appropriated and is not inherently pernicious**

Gregory Fernando **Pappas 17**, Associate Professor of Philosophy at Texas A&M University, “The Limitations and Dangers of Decolonial Philosophies: Lessons from Zapatista Luis Villoro,” Radical Philosophy Review, vol. 20, no. 2, 2017, pp. 265–295

For Villoro a **serious study** of ideologies has to be **as specific to time and place as possible**. The quest for **theoretical barometers** of **good** and **evil** at a **global level** and **across history** should be **subject to critical suspicion** and **may be futile** since the present ideological function of a concept/category is **not always determined** by its **past use** or the **original purpose** for which it was created. A distinction created to oppress may **play a different function** or **have different functions** in **different social contexts**. Modernity and liberalism have **not always functioned** as ideologies or **to the same degree**, **nor** does it make sense to claim that they **always will**. **Even native thought** (indigenismo) can **become an ideology** if adopted to keep the oppressed in their place, i.e., if it **perpetuates subordination** or **oppression**.39 If Villoro is correct in the above analysis then decolonial views are vulnerable to inaccuracy and insensitivity, especially those that wish to trace back to 1492 and across different countries the ideologies that have supported coloniality—such as modernity, capitalism, or liberalism. Villoro did not ignore how historically similar colonial structures were throughout the Americas, but for him ideologies and the logic of domination that operate in one particular place and time **may not operate** in the **exact same way** in another, especially in such a complex and diverse region as the whole of Latin America. If domination and exclusion via ideologies are **local**, its diagnosis and remedies **must also have to be local**. We need to **be careful** when we **extrapolate from one context to another**.

Villoro raised a similar criticism of leftist reactions to the problem of **Eurocentrism** that relies on **simple formulas** that state we just need to embrace what is “ours” and **reject what is European**. Although Villoro was a critic of Eurocentrism and admirer of indigenous thought, he warned Zea and the Latin Americanist or indigenismos movement to not react to Eurocentrism and the colonial Manichaean ideas, where what is “ours” or indigenous is denigrated, with a mere inversion of the Manicheanism.

For Villoro the Left must **resist the temptation** to rely on **lazy theoretical barometers** of good and evil. It must be able to **provide a basis** for being critical of Western ideas **beyond the fact** that **they are Western** or **come from the oppressor**. **Not all Western concepts**, **standards**, and **categories** are oppressive even to the most non-Western people. To decide between good and evil requires **intelligent discriminative judgment** and **not easy theoretical formulas** according to geopolitical coordinates or cultural origins. Again, even native thought (indigenismo) can become an ideology. He expected the Left to be sensitive to this, but what he actually experienced was a Left **slipping dangerously** toward **subtle Manichaean assumptions**, i.e., **simplistic barometers** about the boundaries between good and evil. This, I am afraid, is a **danger in decolonial thought**, one that **seems unavoidable** as long as they **make central to their project** the **coloniality axis** that **relies on binaries** to determine the direction of good and evil. I am aware that it is not easy to oppose a binary without just inverting it, but we must be careful.

To be fair, decolonial thought has been **critical of Manichaeism** as part of the colonial legacy and there is **no doubt** about their **good intentions** to move in a pluralistic direction where there is no one central epistemology. However, this **center-versus-periphery framework is easily susceptible to slipping into the simplistic view that all evil comes from what is at the center—Europe, the West, modernity, liberalism, capitalism**. For instance, Mignolo describes the decolonial project as “delinking” from the West and recovery of the indigenous **as if** this **determines** what is the right path **from evil toward the good**.40 This smells like a **subtle** Manichaeism or at least a position that does **not** permit inquiry that is **sensitive to historical context**. The decolonialists’ **criticism** of the hegemony of the **West** is warranted and **important**, but for it to continue as a growing project that does not succumb to the excesses (vices) of the Left that Villoro diagnosed it must be **careful** to not slip into any of the following **assumption**s:

• Modernity and liberalism were and are **totally bad**; they are ideologies for **dominating**, colonizing, and **oppressing** or **only** have a **darker side**.

• Eurocentrism (interpretation, standpoint) is bad, but philosophy from the periphery is good. •Western concepts have been used to distort or occlude indigenous (non-Western) ones therefore all or most Western concepts distort or contaminate, or are tools of domination.

• Western epistemologies are imperialistic; the epistemologies of each of the colonialized regions are good.

Finding **particular instances** where these assumptions have been explicitly articulated in the decolonial project is not necessary since the point is about the **latent** danger of **slipping into** these assumptions due to what the project is **centered on** or stresses. However, to make the case that I am pointing to a real danger, I next present some examples and controversies within the decolonial literature where a subtle Manicheanism has already raised its ugly head.

Mignolo has come closer than any other decolonial thinker to assume the view that Western epistemologies are imperialistic. Linda Alcoff criticizes Mignolo for “often operating with what appears an overly simplified account of Western philosophical positions.” 41 One way to make Manicheanism work is to provide or assume simplistic accounts of both the good and evil poles. In Mignolo’s case, **varieties** of epistemologies in Europe and the United States are **lumped** together into a **single category** before they are all **easily dismissed** according to an **implicit barometer** of domination/liberation.

**Anarchist geographies terminate in political futility. Recognition by and transformation of state power is the only productive path to emancipation.**

Natasha **King 16**, Taught at the University of Nottingham and Caseworker with the British Refugee Council, No Borders: The Politics of Immigration Control and Resistance, p. 39-42

But to what extent are these experiments in autonomy **ever entirely autonomous**? In response to Richard Day’s book on the newest social movements, Richard Thompson argues that it’s **unrealistic** to talk about creating **wholly autonomous social structures** because ‘[t]he **second they’re consequential** is the **second they’ll be noticed** [by the state]. At that point, it becomes **impossible** to break the cycle of antagonism **by will alone**. They will come after us’ (Thompson n.d., emphasis added). In other words, experiments in autonomy are **rarely** (if **ever**) **entirely free** from a relation to the state, or from state antagonism, and we are **rarely able to ignore that antagonism**. We may **antagonize the state**, but we are **forced also to respond to the state**, as a form of **self-defence**. This has happened **time** and **time again**, from the **steady illegalization of squatting** in Europe, and the **tightening of laws around private property**, to the **infiltration by the CIA of the Black Panther movement**, to the **struggle between the Zapatistas** and the **Mexican state**. We see this in the struggle for the freedom of movement when, continuing with the examples above, the EU employs Frontex special missions on the Turkish/Greek borders, or when the living spaces of people without papers are raided or destroyed. Whether people have been **forced to**, or they have **seen it as the best strategy**, the **history of struggles for liberation** has been one that **included demands on the state**. Often this has taken the form of **engagement in a politics of rights** and/or **recognition**. From the movement of the Sans Papiers in France, to ‘a Day without Migrants’ in the USA; from campaigns that fight against the detention and deportation of people without papers, to struggles against police violence, resistance through forms of **visible collective action** have been **central to struggles against the border**. In most cases such struggles have **made demands on the state**, particularly through **seeking recognition as a group**, and through **making claims to rights**. But to what extent are demands for rights and/or recognition part of a no borders politics? Demands for rights and recognition have played a big part in the struggle for the freedom of movement. Yet there has been a long history of criticism over the politics of citizenship. **Rights claims**, for example, have been seen as **essentially reinforcing the role of the state** as the benefactor and grantor of rights, and **reinforcing the notion** that rights represent entitlements applicable to those who **fit certain descriptions** of being a human (cf. Arendt 1973 [1951]; Barbagallo and Beuret 2008; Bojadžijev and Karakayali 2010; Elam 1994). From this perspective, demands for rights and representation amount to disputes over the allocation of equality and therefore can only ever achieve a redistribution of that equality, rather than undermining the idea that equality is somehow qualified in the first place. As Imogen Tyler says, ‘[c]itizenship is a **famously exclusionary concept**, and its exclusionary force is **there by design**. The exclusions of citizenship are **immanent to its logic**, and **not at all accidental**. Citizenship is meant to **produce successful** and **unsuccessful subjects**. Citizenship, in other words, is “**designed to fail**”’ (Tyler, quoted in Nyers 2015: 31). Similar variations of this critique have appeared in the autonomy of migration debate. Representation can also be thought of as a **bordering technology** that seeks to **pacify** and **discipline expressions of autonomy** (or attempts at escape) (Papadopoulos et al. 2008). In other words, the politics of citizenship is **problematic** because it **only ever brings people into the state**. ‘Of course migrants become stronger when they become visible by obtaining rights, but the demands of migrants and the dynamics of migration cannot be exhausted in the quest for visibility and rights’ (ibid.: 219). I have a lot of **sympathy with these arguments**, and because of them am extremely suspicious of a politics of citizenship. But when it comes to **actual practices of struggle** against the border, a **resolute stand** against such strategies seems **naïve**, and **insulting to those who have taken part**. Migrant-led struggles **have often been claims for rights**, and ultimately I **don’t want to dismiss such practices** because they are **philosophically problematic**. In fact, sometimes to appeal to rights or recognition is the **only available strategy** in situations of **extreme vulnerability**, where people’s options are **highly limited**. Recognizing that we are **in relations of power right now** means also recognizing that our situation is **imperfect** and that we have to **struggle in our (imperfect) reality**. Youssef, a long-time activist for the freedom of movement in Greece, himself of North African descent, talked about the need for pragmatism in tactics; that sometimes we **must engage with the state** in order to **bring about greater freedoms now**. ‘Today, in Creta, in Chania, they will catch five people. How can I take them from the jail? I have something in the police station, OK. I have to talk with them today. OK? But tomorrow I can fuck him. He’s not my friend. He’s not my comrade. OK. We are talking today. Tomorrow we are fucking’ (interview, Youssef). His statement reflects how many practices that refuse the border often come out of necessity. In other words they’re rarely part of some intentional or ‘noble’ act to become a rights-bearer, say, and more often pragmatic decisions based on the need to alleviate immediate situations of oppression. A no borders politics seeks to **go beyond claims** to representation and rights that **ultimately stand to reinforce the state**. But claims to representation and rights **can sometimes do this too**. Building on Foucault’s idea that power can be both **positive** and **empowering** or **negative** and **dominating**, Biddy Martin and Chandra Mohanty suggest that fighting oppression involves seeing power in a way that **refuses totalizing visions** of it and can therefore account for the possibility of resistance, as in creating something new, **within existing power relations** (Martin and Mohanty 2003: 104). Suggesting that representation **only ever brings people into power** therefore means **rejecting a vast range of moments** when the oppressed have **voiced their refusal to be reduced to non-beings** outside of politics (Sharma 2009: 475). In other words, resistance is not only or always a reaction to the constraining effects of dominating power, but can also express power as something positive and liberating. From the **Black Panthers** to the **Sans Papiers**, demands for representation, when carried out by minority groups for themselves, can **challenge the role of dominant power** over that group and **create new**, **emancipated subjectivities** (Goldberg 1996; Malik 1996). Depending on who it is that acts, then, in some cases demands for recognition/rights can be a **radical** and **transformative political act** (Nyers 2015. See also Butler and Spivak 2007; Isin 2008; Nyers and Rygiel 2012). As Nandita Sharma suggests, in response to Papadopoulos et al.’s book Escape Routes, we must recognise that making life and fashioning our subjectivities are intimately intertwined and making ‘new social bodies’ … is not the same as bringing people back into power through identity politics (or identity policing). It is important to recognise that there are significant qualitative differences between subjectivities. There are those that Papadopoulos et al. rightly discuss as bringing us directly back into power – and which account for most of the subjectivities that people hold today (‘race’, ‘nation’, ‘heterosexual’, ‘homosexual’, ‘native’ and so on) – but there are also those that are born of practices of escape. (Sharma 2009: 473, emphasis in original)

**Even if the State does bad things, any alternative is more violent**

Neil A. **Englehart 3**, Assistant Professor of Government and Law at Lafayette College, 2003, “In Defense of State Building: States, Rights, and Justice,” Dissent, Fall, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Academic Search Elite, p. 18

State failure has become an increasingly important policy concern since 9/11. Strengthening or reconstructing failed states has even become an explicit goal of American foreign policy. Yet many Americans across the political spectrum regard states with deep suspicion and abiding hostility, as instruments of oppression. In truth, states are **more likely** to protect human rights than any other form of political organization. Acknowledging that potential is today a moral and political imperative. The evil that states do is well known. There are abundant examples: from the brutality of the Thirty Years War to the Stalinist purges, the Holocaust in Nazi Germany, and the Rwandan genocide. Because its repressive capacities are so clear, political theorists seek to protect us from the state (Locke), to divide and limit its power (Madison), to liberate us from it (Marx), or to dissolve it entirely (Foucault). Yet Hobbes’s picture of life without the state— poor, nasty, brutish, and short—still resonates. States can only be called oppressive if there is an alternative available, a more promising political order. States dominate our minds as much as they dominate the globe. The conceptual hegemony of the state is so great that there has been little serious thinking about alternative arrangements. Anarchist visions may sound liberating, but only because they assume that life under anarchy would be much like it is now—only better. In fact, anarchists depend on the very order they seek to abolish, assuming that people will be treated as free and equal, able to make uncoerced choices outside the protection of the state. Their utopian visions set the parameters of critiques of the state, but they seldom recognize that the necessary substructure of their utopia **doesn’t exist** “nowhere”— it exists only where states have **established law and order**. In real life, the alternatives to the state **are more violent**, **more coercive** social and political orders dominated by warlords and gangs.

Not quite the Hobbesian war of all against all, they are rather wars of group against group, dividing society and **destroying the possibility of a peaceful public sphere**, of civil society, rights, and social justice. The corollary to the oppressiveness of non-state politics is that, contrary to our commonsense understanding, states are relatively **liberating and egalitarian**. Compared to actually existing alternatives, states have more potential for protecting human rights, human security, and international peace than any other political order. That’s why state building is so important.

# 1NR

### EXT Anarchist Geographies Fail

**The state and capital will not wither away from pure disruption. It must be engaged and reoriented toward justice.**

Gearóid **Brinn 20**, PhD Candidate at the University of Melbourne and Research Assistant at La Trobe University, “Smashing the State Gently: Radical Realism and Realist Anarchism”, European Journal of Political Theory, Volume 19, Number 2, p. 206-227

In the radical context, the statement ‘**politics is about power**’ challenges not only a perspective that **neglects** this insight, but one that **expressly rejects** it. There is a major tendency in contemporary anarchism and anarchist-influenced radicalism that explicitly presents as ‘**anti-power**’ (Marshall, 2010: 679; Meltzer, 1993: 11), and anti-realist (Holloway, 2005: 18). This approach proposes **disengagement** and **defection** from the status quo with the implied expectation that **cap**italism and the state could **wither away** through lack of support and without confrontation.9 Realist anarchists oppose this view and argue that realistic efforts to ‘change the world’ **unavoidably entail** the acquisition and exercise of **some forms** of power (Mueller, 2003: 128); that the state and capitalism **will not disappear** without confrontation (Rai, 2015: 177); and that **ignoring** the current mechanisms of power in the hope that they will go away is **not a realistic strategy** for radical social change (Malatesta, 2014 [1922]a: 425).

For a realist anarchist the statement ‘conflict and disagreement are ineradicable’ similarly holds its greatest relevance as a corrective to a mainstream position in radical thought across its history including in the contemporary milieu. Orthodox Marxism, and many of its descendants, held to a long-term vision of a communist utopia where conflict had been reconciled and politics as such had been replaced by ‘the administration of things’ (Adamiak, 1970: 16). Many contemporary anarchists share a similar vision of a post-revolutionary utopia where conflict has been eradicated and where decision-making systems that allow for ongoing disagreement are replaced with those that accept only consensus (see Graeber, 2013: 210–231). Some, like the anti-power tendency discussed above, go beyond the expectation of a future without disagreement and presume the absence of conflict even in the realisation of their utopia. Here ‘everybody’ is made aware of the pressing need for radical social change either through rational argument, or by a sudden realisation or change of consciousness based on the recognition that ‘we are all one’ and have universal shared interests.10 So the realist anarchist perspective on the idea that ‘conflict and disagreement are ineradicable’ is not that conflict is universal and inescapable as with the conservative take, but that conflict cannot be completely eradicated, and that no future post-revolutionary society will be free from antagonisms (Edgley, 2000: 73). Nor does the radical interpretation imply that we must forgo radical aims for an uneasy acceptance of pluralism under a liberal democratic modus vivendi. The realist anarchist perspective, however, is not primarily directed at these conservative defences of dictatorship, or at liberal realist pessimism. Instead it is aimed at anarchists and other radicals who see the possibility of a conflict-free utopia, and propose confrontation-free strategies for its realisation that are based either on withdrawing from political struggle, or on successfully convincing all, through education and rational argument, that the proposed radical alternative is in their best interest. The realist anarchist interpretation means that direct and active struggle for positive change, and against oppression, are necessary; that they will continue to be in any future society; and that future visions and current strategies should reflect this (Edgley, 2000: 73; Gordon, 2007: 64–68).

The idea that political thought should be ‘**concrete** and **oriented towards action**’ (Geuss, 2008: 95) stands in **opposition** to anarchist theory that focuses on the articulation of a **comprehensive vision** of an **alt**ernative system of social organisation, with the implied belief that the **mere articulation** of such a vision should be **enough** to bring about its realisation. It also **counters** anarchist perspectives that present as a position of **permanent critique without any attempt**, or **serious belief**, that an alternative **could actually be achieved**, or those similar (in practice) perspectives which posit a revolutionary future based on **awaiting some precondition** that precipitates radical social change, such as the spontaneous collapse of capitalism due to the unfolding of an inevitable process (Malatesta, 2014 [1922]a: 425; 2014 [1924]a: 461).

This entails recognising the **imperfectability** of radical action and **rejecting ‘purist’ revolutionary perspectives**. Realist anarchism recognises that all action ‘before the revolution’ is **necessarily** and **unavoidably compromised**. Anticapitalists must survive and resist under capitalism while subject to its demands, yet this does not entail that they cannot take any action against it that is not a direct and immediate contribution to the ‘final revolution’ (Malatesta, 2014 [1922] b: 432–433; Rai, 2015: 180). While many anarchists **disdain any** and **all forms of political action** that could be construed as reformist, realist anarchists accept that reformism is **unavoidable** in radical politics. This **should not** be taken to suggest that realist anarchists **exclusively advocate**, or even **particularly prioritise**, **reformism**. They still, as anarchists, advocate a ‘diversity of tactics’, from prefigurative construction of radical institutions and direct action against oppression, to insurrection and revolution. And as realists they determine the **appropriate form** of action according to **context**.

They also argue that, as anarchism is not a fixed idea but a ‘living force’ that constantly responds to and creates ‘new conditions’ (Goldman, 1969: 70), there will always be a need for struggle against oppression, and vigilance against exclusion and subjugation, even after the seemingly most comprehensive and progressive revolutionary change. Any revolution then can only ever be partial, and there can never be a ‘final’ phase of radical social change (Gordon, 2007: 67; Malatesta,2014 [1922]a: 427). Therefore, purist opposition to all reformist struggle is based on an unrealistic hard division between reform and revolution, as revolutions can themselves be seen as ‘the radical reform of institutions, achieved rapidly’ (Malatesta, 1965: 82). So while recognising the importance of revolutionary rupture and upheaval, they also argue that between such events radicals should take ‘all possible reforms with the same spirit that one tears occupied territory from the enemy’s grasp in order to go on advancing’ (Malatesta, 1965: 83).

However, to the extent that realist anarchists endorse reform, they do so only under certain conditions. Firstly, they support reforms that have the capacity to move directly towards radical goals, or to position for future radical gains. To this end they sometimes invoke a distinction similar to that between ‘reformist’ and ‘non-reformist’ reforms articulated by Andre Gorz. Gorz (1967) argued, in relation to labour reforms, that some reforms can have the effect of securing the status quo and others can in fact challenge the status quo and serve as progressive steps towards radical change. Likewise, Malatesta claimed that reforms:

either consolidate the existing regime or undermine it; assist the advent of revolution or hamper it and benefit or harm progress in general, depending on their specific characteristic, the spirit in which they have been granted, and above all, the spirit in which they are asked for, claimed or seized by the people. (Malatesta, 1965: 81)

This distinction has also been employed by various others in relation to issues such as prison abolition (Gilmore, 2007: 183), ecosocialist transformation (Baer, 2017) and the generalised radicalisation of democratic institutions (Mouffe, 2018). The realist anarchist application of this approach will be outlined in more detail in the following section.

Secondly, realist anarchists **endorse reforms** that can have a **direct effect** on alleviating suffering and hardship. They argue that anarchist opposition to all forms of oppression **demands support** for efforts towards the **effective amelioration** of its effects, even if by means of reforms that originate from or are implemented by **ultimately illegitimate institutions** (Malatesta, 2014 [1925]a: 472–473). This position also **rejects** the ‘**worse is better**’ stance of crude radicalism which **accepts inaction** against suffering in the hope that it will lead to a crisis that **precipitates widespread revolution** (Chomsky, 2005: 213). For realist anarchists then the directive that political thought should be ‘**concrete**, and **oriented towards action**’ counters radical theory focused on articulating alternative social models **without considering their implementation**, or which counsels **inaction** in anticipation of a **prophesied perfect moment** for enacting a total, final revolution. As we will see in the following section, these positions have particular relevance to the realist anarchist approach to managing the tension between extremely radical goals and realistic strategy and analysis.

The directive that we should recognise the importance of **history**, **contingency** and **context** in political thought (Baderin, 2014: 144; Rossi and Sleat, 2014: 7) also has particular radical interpretations and implications. The acceptance that ‘politics is historically located’ (Geuss, 2008: 13) might inspire recognition of moments of **historical rupture** – of reform, revolt and revolution – and serve as a reminder of the **constancy of social change**, the **ubiquity of resistance** against illegitimate authority and that society could be **radically otherwise** (Chomsky, 1996: 85–86). This perspective on historical contingency is also relevant to one of the most longstanding disagreements in revolutionary thought. Anarchists have long opposed the teleological view of history associated with orthodox Marxism, and contemporary anarchists especially reaffirm the contingency of historical processes, and that history does not unfold according to a predetermined schedule (Wigger, 2016: 134). For realist anarchists this means that radicals must act – they must recognise their agency in history and that there is nothing necessary about the currently dominant social, political and economic forms, nor anything inevitable about revolutionary change.

This action, however, must recognise and respond to context. Realist anarchists ‘cannot impose an iron-clad program or method on the future’ but must ‘leave posterity to develop its own particular systems, in harmony with its needs’ (Goldman, 1969: 49). There cannot be a single revolutionary strategy or utopian model that is generally applicable regardless of political, economic, historical and cultural contexts. Radical action and efforts towards social change must conform to particular, contingent requirements (Malatesta, 2014 [1924]b: 453). For those committed to radically democratic and generally emancipatory politics, this implies that the details of radical actions and organisational models that apply in particular contexts that action must conform to are not merely to be determined by elites, but by the democratic self-determination of the peoples within those contexts (Chomsky, 2005: 221–222; Turcato, 2015: 217–218). So for a realist anarchist the recognition of context also calls radicals to humility – to the acceptance that the detailed construction of universal models of (even radical) democracy by intellectual elites goes beyond the legitimate set of tasks that a radical political theorist can undertake.

One tenet within the recent re-articulation of realism in political theory might appear an insurmountable obstacle to the reconciliation of anarchist radicalism and the realist disposition. Both radical and liberal realists in the recent realist discourse argue against an ‘ethics-first’ approach to political theory (Geuss, 2008: 9; Williams, 2005). An ethics-first approach to political theory is described as the view that ‘politics is applied ethics’ – where a priori ethical principles are first determined and politics subsequently framed as the application of those principles. Those familiar with standard representations of anarchism would be forgiven for assuming that all forms of anarchism are based on just such an ethics-first approach. Anarchism is often defined as the application of the principle that all authority is illegitimate (e.g. Newman, 2015: 1–2). Many anarchists also advocate a purist application of this position which equates to the implementation of the implicit principle ‘never engage with, or endorse with cooperation, any illegitimate institution’ which is clearly a non-realist moralistic principle on the order of Kant’s ‘never lie even to save a life’ (Kant in Geuss, 2008: 8). This position is indeed prevalent in contemporary anarchism. It is associated with the stance suggested above by the non-realist perspectives that realist anarchist positions are often levelled against (i.e. the anarchist tendency which aims for a conflict-free utopia through universalist strategies that neglect considerations of power, history and context).

Realist anarchism, however, is not the application of a moral belief that all coercion is immoral or that all authority is illegitimate, nor does it proceed from an a priori moral principle of any kind. Instead, realist anarchism is based on a sceptical stance towards all authority based on a realist appreciation of one of the qualities that humans appear to exhibit across history and independent of culture. That is, that people generally do not seem to accept being controlled, dominated and oppressed, and history suggests that the attempt to do so will usually draw some form of resistance and, in time, be seen as an illegitimate form of authority. Rather than a moral or ethical principle, this is a realist observation much like that which sees humans as driven not only by rational calculation, and this insight is similarly derived from the interpretations of the central tenets of a realist disposition described above. Attention to history, the actual realities that drive people to political action, the ubiquity of resistance, struggle and change, lead realist anarchists to see it as a realistic and pragmatic stance to be sceptical towards all forms of authority11 (Chomsky, 1970: viii). Though they may seem similar, complete opposition is importantly distinct in its implications when compared with scepticism towards all forms of authority. Scepticism entails that the onus of proof should be placed on those that see unequal power relations as legitimate, and no form of authority should be considered immune from the requirement to justify its necessity on the terms of those subject to it. It also entails, however, the recognition that some forms of authority can indeed be accepted as legitimate, and beyond this, that even illegitimate institutions and practices can, under some circumstances, be considered relatively acceptable when compared with other currently available alternatives (Chomsky, 1996: 73–74).

This scepticism is levelled not at one form of authority, such as the state, but at all forms, and it is combined with a concrete, action-orientated realist perspective which, in its radical iteration, entails immediate opposition to oppression rather than awaiting a teleological unfolding of history or the idea that ‘the worse, the better’ for radical politics (Chomsky, 2005: 213). Therefore, the realist anarchist perspective recognises the unavoidable tension in radical positions which oppose various forms of illegitimate authority simultaneously. Rather than proceeding according to the application of a moralistic principle such as ‘never engage with an illegitimate institution’, the realist anarchist must compare and balance tensions between their oppositions to different forms of illegitimate authority according to the particular historical and political contexts. This weighing of relative priority between opposition to different forms of illegitimate authority, for example those associated with capitalism and the state, leads realist anarchists to perhaps their most controversial and challenged stance – a nuanced and pragmatic approach to the state. As noted, there are anarchists who advocate the complete withdrawal and disengagement from formal political institutions, and propose a future radical alternative based on absolutely no formal political structures. Realist anarchism is not one of these forms of radical thought. The nuanced realist anarchist stance towards political institutions and engagement with them is, as we will see in the next section, central to understanding realist anarchism as an actually-existing form of realism that is based on both an unflinchingly realistic attitude to political thought and action, as well as a far-reaching, utopian radicalism that calls for social change that appears, in current contexts, to be patently impossible.

Demanding the impossible while being realistic: Anarchism within the state

In my view, the state is an illegitimate institution. But it does not follow from that that you should not support the state. (Chomsky, 2005: 212)

While anarchism is sometimes portrayed as little more than an uncompromising opposition to the state (e.g. Wolff, 1970), a nuanced approach to the state is the most contentious element of the tendency that I have been referring to as realist anarchism. It is implicitly affirmed by some (Malatesta, 2014 [1925]a: 473; Shantz, 2010: 85–86), and explicitly but without emphasis by others (Gordon, 2007: 154–155). However, those who have openly and defiantly stated this position (Chomsky, 1996) or have been perceived as doing so (Bookchin, 1998) have courted denunciation and ‘excommunication’ by other anarchists.12 This approach to formal political institutions, and the state in particular, is drawn from a **fairly obvious logical extrapolation** of opposition to all forms of oppression including both the state and capitalism, and the insistence that oppression must be **actively resisted** rather than **ignored** in the hope that a teleological process will deliver emancipation. Simply then, the realist anarchist **does not consider** the state to be a **legitimate institution**, yet still holds that **some actions** of the state can be **positive** when they are directed at **preventing a relatively greater oppression** imposed by another form of illegitimate authority. The primary way that the realist anarchist argues that the state can sometimes be considered **relatively legitimate** (or at least a ‘**lesser evil**’) is in relation to the tension between opposing both contemporary capitalism and the state simultaneously. There are two main ways that realist anarchists argue this tension can lead to anarchist engagement with, and support for, the state: for protecting people from pressing negative social effects of capitalism (Rai, 2015: 180); and to reform current social, political and economic institutions in accordance with radical goals, or to position radical movements to move further towards radical goals in the most realistic manner possible (Malatesta, 2014 [1922]b: 433).

Anarchist involvement in local social organising has imbued the contemporary milieu with a keen awareness of the relatively positive effect of state-based social services considering the increase in suffering created by their withdrawal. Therefore, in recent decades under widespread neoliberal political and ideological hegemony, anarchists have often opposed privatisation of public services and other state-owned enterprises (Shantz, 2010: 85–88). Their sensitivity to social issues also leads many contemporary anarchist groups to enter into alliances with nonanarchist radical and non-radical community and activist groups, including single-issue reformist campaigns that call directly on the state for social provisions, in order to more effectively tackle issues of marginalisation, inequality and hardship (Gordon, 2007: 58–59). In fact, in the context of several decades of leftist retreat and defeat, including the privatisation of essential industries and social services, some anarchist organisations openly support re-nationalisation efforts (MacSimoin, 2007; Van Der Walt, 1996). Realist anarchists then prefer state control of means of production when the alternative is private ownership and, in the wake of decades of privatisation, support re-nationalisation as they see publiclyowned industries as more advantageous sites from which to agitate for direct worker control – a long-held anarchist organisational goal (Marshall, 2010: 7–9).

In contrast to the stereotypical depiction of anarchism, then, realist anarchists **avoid simplistic slogans** like **‘smashing the state’** and emphasise the **replacement** of illegitimate institutions rather than their **simple destruction** – ‘we **must not destroy anything that satisfies human need**, however badly – until we have **something better** to put in its place’ (Malatesta, 2014 [1925]a: 473). This position entails efforts towards the prefigurative construction of such alternatives, and indeed much of the energy of contemporary anarchist movements is dedicated to such efforts (see e.g. Shantz, 2010). However, it also recognises the **relatively positive use** of state power that many anarchists are **reluctant to admit explicitly** but that realist anarchists openly acknowledge (Bookchin, 1979: 29; Chomsky, 2002: 344; Gordon, 2007: 154). So, their recognition of the tension between opposing the oppression and suffering induced by capitalism while simultaneously opposing the state drives realist anarchists **away from purist disengagement** with the state and towards acceptance of the need to **support reformist measures** against oppression and suffering.